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Tell all the truth, but tell it slant-
Success in circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm delight 
The truth's superb surprise 
As lightning to the children eased 
With explanation kind 
The truth must dazzle gradually 
Or every man be blind-
Emily Dickinson 
(Transcript page 66, lines 4-12) 
Quoted by Judge Young 
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I. STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction to review final judgments of the District 
Court and such jurisdiction is set forth in the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Section 3, UCA 78-
2-2; and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 5. 
This case was assigned to the Court of Appeals on December 21, 1994 by the Supreme 
Court. 
The judgment to be reviewed is final, was signed by the District Court on October 24, 
1994 and filed by the clerk on October 25,1994. 
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II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Is the case petty, such that no cause of action existed for which the court 
could render a judgment for either party? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court of Appeals should apply a correction of error standard. 
The plaintiff filed this case because a statute permitted and even mandated relief for refusal to 
reconvey real property. The Trial Court's determination that the case was petty involved an 
interpretation of statute, which interpretation was incorrect. The plaintiff established at trial all 
of the elements necessary to prove a prima facie case. 
2. Are damages only speculative and of such nature that the court could find no 
damages? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court of Appeals should apply a correction of error standard. 
The plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence at trial to prove reasonable, actual and certain 
damages. The Trial Court indulged in its own speculative reasoning to avoid reviewing the 
evidence and the conclusions are incorrect. 
3. Was the court's ruling that the case was dismissed with prejudice reversible 
error? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court of Appeals should apply a correction of error standard, 
which incorporates an abuse of discretion review. The Court must determine whether the 
plaintiff established the elements at trial to put forth a prima facie case regarding statutory 
violation for refusal to reconvey real property. The Court will surely find that the elements were 
established and dismissal was incorrect, as a matter of law. There was sufficient showing by the 
8 
parties at trial to find for or against the plaintiff. 
4. Is there sufficient evidence in the record for the Court of Appeals to reach its 
own findings of fact and conclusions of law? 
The Court of Appeals should review this matter for independent determination and enter 
its own determination of damages for the plaintiff. The evidence exists on the record to make 
such an independent determination. A remand is unnecessary and grossly prejudicial. An 
independent determination is necessary to avoid the injustice already done. 
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III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed-
Reconveyance of trust property... Any beneficiary 
under such a trust deed who refuses to request a 
Reconveyance from the Trustee for a period of 30 
days after written demand therefor is made by the 
Trustor...shall be liable to the Trustor...for double 
damages resulting from such refusal or such Trustor 
...may bring an action against the beneficiary...to 
compel a Reconveyance of the trust property and in 
such action the judgment of the court shall be... that 
the beneficiary pay to the Trustor...the costs of suit 
including a reasonable attorney's fee and all 
damages resulting from the refusal of the 
beneficiary to request a Reconveyance as here and 
above provided. UCA 57-1-33 
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
The case filed in District Court involved an action at law pursuant to 
statute for damages resulting to the plaintiff when the defendant refused to 
execute a release, reconvey a Trust Deed or request a Reconveyance of Real 
Property secured by a Trust Deed. The plaintiff suffered damages when the 
refusal prevented his refinancing of the property. 
B. Statement of Facts 
This case proceeded to trial on May 25, 1994 pursuant to the Plaintiffs 
complaint to quiet title, alleging statutory violation for refusing to reconvey a 
trust deed in accordance with UCA 57-1-16. The trial court received the Plaintiffs 
testimony that he entered into a trust deed note payable to Defendant and secured 
by the trust deed covering the property, which is the subject matter of the law suit 
and is described as Lot 381, Highland Estates Plat A, and subsequently satisfied 
the note. Nevertheless, Defendant refused to reconvey the deed in timely fashion, 
even though she was provided with formal notice and request. As a result of the 
refusal to reconvey, Plaintiff testified that he was unable to refinance a mortgage 
on the home at a lower interest rate and lost the benefit of decreasing the interest 
rate from 9% to 7%, which difference equates to a loss of $64,202. The trial court 
received into evidence documents substantiating the Plaintiffs oral testimony. 
After receiving oral testimony from the defense, which was not supported by any 
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documentary evidence, the trial court dismissed the case with prejudice, each 
party to bear its own attorneys fees and costs. Subsequently, the court signed a 
final order with findings of fact, conclusions of law and a judgment. 
C. Course of the Proceedings 
The plaintiff filed a case to which he was entitled by law in the State of 
Utah. The cause of action is clearly set forth in the statutes. He did everything in 
the undertaking of the lawsuit that was required by statute. 
The defendant, his sister, refused to reconvey a trust deed, stating at trial 
that she did so because of a family feud, because her brother intimidated her and 
so forth. For the first time, at trial, she attempted to claim that the plaintiff had 
not satisfied all of the conditions precedent. Nevertheless, eventually she 
reconveyed, after the plaintiff had sustained the damages complained of. The 
eventual compliance operates as a waiver of any asserted defense at trial. 
The Trial Court, displeased with the way the parties handled the matter, 
lectured them both at trial, treating them like little children, and failed to address 
the merits of the lawsuit. The Judge's demeanor was an embarrassment to the 
very judicial canons of conduct which were designed to prevent such abuse. The 
court's personal opinions clouded justice and resulted in dismissal of an action at 
law that was well founded. 
The trial court overlooked the plaintiffs right to due process. The plaintiff 
established a prima facie case pursuant to statute and proved damages that were 
clear, reasonable and real. The law entitles the plaintiff to the remedies 
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contemplated by statute for refusing to reconvey trust deeds. He is entitled to 
recover double damages. 
Instead, the plaintiffs claim was summarily dismissed. This Court must 
correct the errors of the trial court and apply its independent judgment to grant the 
plaintiff what the statutes contemplated. 
D. Disposition in the Trial Court 
The trial court incorrectly found the the plaintiffs case was petty, that he 
introduced only speculative evidence and that he had no cause of action, 
dismissing the case with prejudice. 
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V. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court dismissed this case because in its overly personal opinion 
the Judge found the action to be petty. 
The plaintiff proved a prima facie case in accordance with the 
requirements of the statute creating his cause of action, showing that the 
defendant refused to reconvey real property. Apparently because the trial court 
disapproved of a dispute between the parties the judge ruled that there was no 
cause of action. Such a ruling is incorrect. The manner in which the parties 
conducted themselves does not render the legality of a claim invalid. The 
dismissal of this matter was incorrect and must be overturned by the Court of 
Appeals. 
The plaintiff proved reasonable and actual damages as a result of the 
defendant's failure to reconvey, similar to damages accepted by the court in other 
cases. Apparently because the trial court thought the plaintiff might have pursued 
alternatives it found only speculative damages. Such reasoning, however, is 
incorrect. The plaintiff proved damages and the record contains adequate 
evidence of same. To find otherwise is incorrect. 
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The Court of Appeals has sufficient evidence in the record to make an 
independent determination of the prima facie case and damages. The Court is 
requested to enter an independent review and award because the conduct of the 
trial court was so reprehensible as to constitute gross injustice. 
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VI. DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
The conclusions of law set forth by the trial court are: 
1. Court stated case was petty. 
2. Court stated damages only speculative. 
The trial court's conclusions are incorrect. The appellate court must apply 
a correction of error standard in reviewing the conclusions of law for correctness. 
This court is urged to review the trial court's conclusions, applying the broadest 
scope of judicial review to these questions of law: "...appellate courts have 
traditionally been seen as having the power and duty to say what the law is and to 
ensure that it is uniform throughout the jurisdiction." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 
932 , 936. The trial court's determination of law in this case is an incorrect 
application of controlling case law with regard to speculative damages and clearly 
erroneous with regard to pettiness. After determining the question of'correctness', 
this court is urged to enter its own determinations, recognizing that such 
determinations are often the sum of several rulings, each of which may be 
reviewed under a separate standard of review. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870 
(Utah 1993). This court has the authority to make its own legal determinations 
because "the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any 
degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah 1993). When an appellant has challenged conclusions of law in civil cases 
the court is to apply a correction of error standard and a trial court's conclusions of 
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law in civil cases are to be reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines Co. 
v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993); Society Of 
Separationists} Inc. v. Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993). "Correctness" 
means that no particular deference is given to the trial court's ruling on questions 
of law. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); Provo River Utah Water 
Users'Ass'n. v. Morgan, 856 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993). 
1. Court Stated Damages Only Speculative 
Even though testimony and documentary evidence received by the trial 
judge was sufficient to establish the fact of damages permitting the trier of fact to 
determine damages with reasonable certainty, the trial court found that damages 
were only speculative. This legal conclusion is incorrect and the appellate court is 
urged to enter its own determination. 
At trial the Plaintiff testified as follows: 
A. Both parties entered into a contract with a Buy-out Agreement. 
(Transcript page 6, lines 15-22.) 
B. The Appellant had an agreement with the Appellee that she would 
pay half of the cost of cleaning a rug, plus Appellee's share of utility and phone 
bills, which would be taken out of trust deed payments. (Transcript page 8, lines 
1 through 10.) 
C. The Appellant offset $98.30 owed by the Appellee for her share of 
the rug, utilities and phone bills. (Transcript page 27, lines 4-15.) 
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D. Subsequent to the Buy-out Agreement there was an agreement 
between the parties that $98.30 would be deducted from the total of what was due 
and owing on the trust deed. (Transcript page 28, lines 18-22.) 
E. The Trust Deed Note of $5,211 was paid off in full in February, 
1992 minus the offset of $98.30. (Transcript page 30, lines 13-20.) 
F. After making all payments on the trust deed (Buy-out Agreement) 
Appellant requested a reconveyance of title through Founder's Title Co. 
(Transcript page 9, lines 1 through 22.) 
G. The reconveyance was requested by document dated June 8, 1992. 
(Transcript page 10, lines 4-5.) 
H. The Appellant subsequently requested a reconveyance personally 
by registered mail. (Transcript page 11, lines 24-25 and page 12, line 2.) 
I. The Appellant tried to refinance the trust deed secured property 
with Cako Financial, paying $448 in fees. (Transcript page 13, lines 7 through 
19.) 
J. The Appellant was approved for a loan on November 21,1992 
subject to reconveyance at closing. (Transcript page 15, line 10 and page 16, lines 
16-18.) 
K. The closing on the property did not occur because the 
reconveyance did not take place and the trust deed was still on the title report. 
(Transcript page 19, lines 4 through 15.) 
L. The Appellant had been approved for a 30 year refinancing loan at 
7%. (Transcript page 21, lines 1-2.) 
M. The Appellant's existing loan on the property was for 30 years at 
9%. The difference between 7% for thirty years and 9% for thirty years is 
$64,202. (Transcript page 21, line 25 and page 22, lines 1-10.) 
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At trial the Defendant testified as follows: 
A. The trust deed note has never been paid in full and the shortfall is 
$98.30. (Transcript page 45, lines 18-21). 
B. The Defendant did not respond to the Title Company's request to 
release the note for reconveyance because of a family feud and hasn't spoken to 
her brother, the plaintiff, in over three years. (Transcript page 48, line 20 and 
page 47, lines 3-24). 
C. The Defendant ultimately reconveyed after the law suit was filed 
and because she wasn't interested in extending the family feud any longer. 
(Transcript page 48, lines 15-22). 
The practical effect of the defendant's testimony is that by eventual 
reconveyance, she renders moot any defense she might have attempted to raise 
over a shortfall in payments and the court should find that the note was paid in 
full. 
The trial court received into evidence the following documents which 
directly relate to the above testimony of the plaintiff with regard to failure to 
reconvey and damages: 
A. Buyout Agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant dated 8/27/91. 
(Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit PI) 
B. Trust Deed Note dated 9/1/91. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit P12) 
C. Founders Title Co. Letter dated 6/8/92 requesting release for 
reconveyance. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit P2) 
D. Dennis McGrail letter dated 9/7/93 requesting surrender of Trust 
Deed. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit P3) 
E. Cako Financial Title Report and Loan Approval. (Plaintiffs Trial 
Exhibit P5) 
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F. Cako Financial letter indicating prevention from closing until lien 
satisfied. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit P7) 
G. Deed of Reconveyance dated 4/5/94. (Plaintiffs Trial Exhibit P8) 
The appellate court must enter its own determination that the record 
contains sufficient evidence to determine damages and that the damages 
demonstrated by the Plaintiff were not merely speculative. The court is urged to 
find "that the evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the Appellant that 
reasonable minds would necessarily have harbored a reasonable doubt on the 
outcome of the case." State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah App. 1990). The 
fact of damages must be proven with reasonable certainty and the amount by a 
reasonable, though not necessarily precise estimate. Atkin, Wright & Miles v. 
Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985); 
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson, 692 P2.d 728 (Utah 1984). At trial the Plaintiff met the 
burden set forth in Acculog to produce a sufficient evidentiary basis to establish 
the fact of damages and to permit the trier of fact to determine damages with 
reasonable certainty. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Wornick, 664 P.2d 1161 (Utah 
1983); Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Associates, Inc. 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982); 
Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Inc., 593 P.2d 1303 (Utah 1979). Only 
when there is no evidence on point introduced at trial and, therefore, nothing 
before the trial court to establish the amount of damages, can the trial court enter a 
finding that damages were only speculative. Sawyers v. FMA Leasing Co., 722 
P.2d773 (Utah 1986). 
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At trial the Plaintiff/Appellant established that: 
1. He paid off and satisfied the provisions of the Trust Deed note. 
2. In spite of repeated requests, the Appellee failed to reconvey the 
Deed. 
3. Failure to reconvey prevented the Appellant from refinancing the 
property, even though he had been approved for a 7% refinancing loan. 
4. The failure to reconvey the property resulted in a loss of the 
advantage of 2 percentage points on refinancing, which equates to $64,202. 
The trial court incorrectly applied binding case law and this court must 
apply correct law to change the outcome. The trial court's interpretation of 
binding case law presents a question of law and the appellate court must review 
the trial court's interpretation of that law for correctness. See State v. Richardson, 
843 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah App. 1992). 
The evidence shows a reasonable basis for a finding of actual and not 
merely speculative damages. Commercial Security Bank v. Hodson, 393 P.2d 482 
(S. Ct. 1964). The court set forth factors in Commercial Security Bank to evaluate 
reasonable certainty which included competency of those seeking a loan, 
confidence of success, loan committee approval of a loan, availability of the 
commodity securing the loan, and operational or transactional cost determination. 
All of these factors can be utilized to evaluate the reasonableness of a finding of 
actual and not merely speculative damages for the Appellant. Appellant sets 
forth the following evaluation: 
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The evidence presented at trial also shows a reasonable basis for a finding 
of actual damages. Utilizing the factors from Commercial Security Bank, in this 
matter Cako Financial obviously found the Appellant competent to seek a loan 
because they approved him for the loan for which he actually submitted an 
application and paid fees. Cako Financial indicated that the property securing the 
loan needed to be reconveyed. The failure to reconvey is the very reason why this 
lawsuit was filed and the trial took place. The failure to reconvey is the very 
reason why the Appellant suffered damages. The damages are easily measurable 
and determinable. These are the very factors that the courts have previously 
identified to evaluate a finding of actual and not merely speculative damages. 
The Appellant proved reasonable damages at trial in the amount of $64, 
202. This amount was never questioned or rebutted by any evidence introduced 
by the Appellee. 
The trial court's legal conclusion is incorrect and the appellate court must 
enter its own determination without deferring in any degree to the trial judge. 
2. Court Stated Case Was Petty 
The trial court was incorrect in entering a determination that the case was 
petty as a legal conclusion. The appellate court is urged to determine that the 
Plaintiff has a cause of action pursuant to Utah Codes Annotated 57-1-16, for 
which relief is requested directly from the appellate court, awarding damages in 
the amount proved at trial totaling $64,202 to the Plaintiff. In addition thereto, 
the appellate court is urged to award the Plaintiff double damages, costs of suit 
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including a reasonable attorneys fee as provided under the statute, and costs of 
appeal including a reasonable attorneys fee. 
The Plaintiff filed his action pursuant to the provisions of UCA 57-1-33, 
which states as follows: 
Satisfaction of obligation secured by 
trust deed-Reconveyance of trust property... Any 
beneficiary under such a trust deed who refuses 
to request a Reconveyance from the Trustee for 
a period of 30 days after written demand 
therefore , is made by the Trustor...shall be 
liable to the Trustor...for double damages 
resulting from such refusal or such 
Trustor...may bring an action against the 
beneficiary...to compel a Reconveyance of the 
trust property and in such action the judgment 
of the court shall be...that the beneficiary pay to 
the Trustor...the costs of suit including a 
reasonable attorney's fee and all damages 
resulting from the refusal of the beneficiary to 
request a Reconveyance as here and above 
provided. 
The trial judge's determination that the case is petty is improper, incorrect, arbitrary, 
capricious and violative of judicial canons. It is without basis at law. The Plaintiff met 
jurisdictional requirements both in equity and in law to maintain the action. Appellant is unable 
to comprehend the trial judges determination that the matter is petty. A legal definition of petty 
would require that this case be filed in small claims court, which is not permissible because the 
damages claimed clearly exceed jurisdictional limits of the small claims court, which would 
otherwise handle petty matters. 
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The trial judge's determination that the case is petty reflects his demeanor during the trial. 
Canon 3 requires that a judge should maintain decorum in his proceedings. Canon 4 requires that 
a judge be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants. Canon 5 requires that a judge be alert to 
avoid behavior that may be perceived as prejudicial. Canon 7 requires that a judge accord to 
every person that is interested in a proceeding, full right to be heard according to law. A judge 
may be disqualified if he has a strong personal bias involving an issue in a case. Nevertheless, 
Appellant is not aware of any case where a decision of a trial court has been set aside because of 
a violation of a Canon. See Regional Sales Agency v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252 (S Ct 1992). 
Appellant urges, however, that the appellate court determine damages, costs, and fees directly 
because the judge's demeanor in the trial of this case was such that remand to the trial judge for 
further proceedings will be prejudicial against the Plaintiff. 
Appellant cites the following examples from the record: 
JUDGE YOUNG: I will just tell you both this 
is one of the most petty, silly cases I have ever seen in a 
courtroom by stubborn, self-centered, foolish family members. 
And both of you are that way. I can't even believe this. Can't 
even begin to believe this, this petty, petty, petty silly case. 
You can step down. 
MS. WAGNER: I have to cross examine her, 
Your Honor. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Oh. 
(Transcript page 51, lines 18-25 and page 52, line 1.) 
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JUDGE YOUNG: ...its a pathetic circumstance to 
ask me—and I don't exonerate either one of these parties--
but this is a pathetic circumstance to come to me and 
claim, first of all, he is entitled to 50 or 60,000 dollars 
because she failed to reconvey, when she had entitlement 
of $5,200 and she got $5,100, or $100 less that was due. 
The idea that he is entitled to get 50 or 60,000 dollars is 
nonsense. I'm not about to give him that. In fact, if I had 
a way, I would impose for abusive process a judgment for 
both of these parties for about 5,000 dollars and let 'em 
each pay that to the Court for bringing this petty case to 
court. Its the worst case I have had in seven and a half to 
eight years of pettiness. (Transcript page 64, lines 11-22.) 
JUDGE YOUNG: my job is not to be a 
psychologist and my job is not to mend family fences and 
my job is not to try to reconcile you and your sister. 
MR. MCGRAIL: that's not the issue here. The 
issue is she wouldn't reconvey the lien and that prevented 
me from getting the loan. 
JUDGE YOUNG: well I don't believe it. Okay? 
So I think that there could have been ways to get around 
that easily. I've suggested several of them. And I don't 
believe that if you had gone to a mortgage company, 
explained the situation, that the mortgage company would 
have denied giving you the loan. 
MR. MCGRAIL: that's exactly what happened. 
(Transcript page 67, lines 20-25 and page 68, lines 1-7.) 
JUDGE YOUNG:...there is an old verse about 
here lies the body of Solomon Gray who died defending 
his right -of-way. He was dead right as he sped along but 
he's just as dead as if he'd been wrong. And that's 
exactly what we've got here. We've got two stubborn, 
petty people, raised in the same household. (Transcript 
page 70, line 25 and page 71, lines 1-5.) 
Most of the judicial cannons were violated by the trial court's conduct in this 
matter. It is apparent that the judge's bias is so strong that a remand would be 
extremely prejudicial to the Appellant. The Court simply ignored the evidence 
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presented by the plaintiff and proceeded to a whole liteny of its own speculative what-if 
possibilities to apparently justify failure to consider the case presented by the plaintiff. 
JUDGE YOUNG: Let me just say this. That 
refinancing is a strawman. There is no difficulty 
refinancing this property if he had wanted. For one thing, 
he could have coughed up $5,000. He could have paid 
up—he could walk to the title company and show them all 
the loan, the Trust Deed, the $5,200 or whatever the 
amount of it was, he could show them that. He could say, 
look, I will put that money in Escrow, and just to assure 
you that there will be money to cover the payment to my 
sister if she hasn't paid. I mean, she would have — there 
were so many alternative routes around this diminimous 
deed of reconveyance for $5,000 but he was too stubborn. 
As he testified in his direct testimony, it became a matter 
of principal. Well you know, principal is something that 
also must be based not in stubbornness but in sound 
judgement. The average man has five senses, taste, touch, 
sight, smell and hearing. The above-average man has two 
more senses, horse and common. He lacked both, horse-
sense and common-sense. There is no way that he could 
not have gone to somebody and obtained that loan by 
explaining look, I've got a blood feud with my sister and 
then said to them, the total amount of this note that she 
owes to me, or that I owe to her, excuse me, the total 
amount that I owe her is $5,200, whatever that number 
was, and I can show you canceled checks I've paid to her 
of all but $100. I will either one, put $100 in Escrow or I 
will put $5,000 in Escrow just to show you that I will 
have money available to pay my sister and to cover that 
Trust Deed in the event that she ever has any legitimate 
claims. I will indemnify you, lender, against this second 
Trust Deed. That could have been done so easily. 
(Transcript page 60, lines 6-25 and page 61, lines 1-12.) 
Because the bias and prejudice of the trial judge is supported by a review of the record, the 
appellate court is not required to sustain his ruling. Appellant urges that his determination that the case 
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is petty reflects an arbitrariness and capriciousness that further imposes a duty to enter an independent 
determination by the appellate court. The evidence so clearly preponderates in favor of the Appellant 
that reasonable minds would necessarily have harbored a reasonable doubt on the outcome of the case. 
State v. Peters, 796 P.2d 708, 710 (Utah App. 1990). 
JUDGE YOUNG: Well, the Court finds that 
this case is petty and is silly and is dismissed for no 
cause of action. Each party is charged with bearing 
their own costs and fees associated with this case. 
That the Plaintiff has failed to prove any damages 
that could have resulted, other than speculative 
damages, and the Court finds that it is not my 
business to solve your family feud. Now, you can 
walk out of this Court and continue a family feud, 
which, to me, I will have absolutely no interest in. 
Makes no difference to me how well the McGrail 
family gets along. But its pretty damn petty and 
you ought to stop it and quit being so stubborn. 
(Transcript page 72, lines 9-23). 
The trial court's determination that the case is petty necessarily reflects its interpretation 
of the statute, which is the basis of the Plaintiffs cause of action. The Appellant challenges the 
trial court's determination and conclusion of law. The trial court's interpretation of statutes is a 
question of law that can be reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. See, e.g., State v. 
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993); Onglnt'l (UPSA), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P.2d 
447, 455 (Utah 1993). 
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3. Dismissal 
The trial court ordered that the case be dismissed with each party to bear its own costs 
and attorneys fees. Once the appellate court has made its own determination of the conclusions 
of law set forth above, Appellant urges this court to find that dismissal of the case is an abuse of 
discretion, and that the ruling is so unreasonable that it can be classified as arbitrary and that no 
reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Kunzler v. O' Dell 855 P.2d 
270, 275 (Utah App. 1993); Aimes v. Mass, 846 P.2d 468, 476 (Utah App. 1993). The exercise 
of discretion necessarily reflects the judgment of the trial judge, which Appellant has 
demonstrated above is improper. The appellate court can properly find abuse if no reasonable 
person would take the view adopted by the trial court. State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 
(Utah 1978); State v. Nuttall, 861 P.2d 454, 456 (Utah App. 1993). 
Application of an abuse of discretion standard to the dismissal of the case, however, is 
merely supplementary. This issue is a subsidiary ruling which can also be reviewed for 
correctness. The appellate court is authorized to determine whether a dismissal is proper as a 
conclusion of law by applying a correction of error standard. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991); Hansen v. Dept. of Fin. Insts., 858 P.2d 184, 
186 (Utah App. 1993). Appellant urges that the court enter its own determination regarding 
damages, double damages, attorneys fees and costs pursuant to statute and attorneys fees and 
costs on appeal because the appellate court is entitled to determine whether a party has proved a 
prima facie case. Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 1141,1144 (Utah App. 
1994); Handy v. Union Pac R.R., 841 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Utah App. 1992). 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court incorrectly found that the plaintiffs case was petty, ignoring the fact that 
a prima facie case was established at trial, finding instead that there was no cause of action. The 
court wrongfully disregarded a statute that gave the plaintiff rights to a legal remedy. 
The Trial Court incorrectly found that the plaintiff presented only speculative damages, 
when in fact reasonable and actual damages were established. The court's own bias mandated a 
dismissal of a case incorrectly. 
The Court of Appeals is requested to review the case for correction of error and apply its 
own independent determination. Once it has done so, it must find first, that the plaintiff must 
prevail on his statutory cause of action for failure to reconvey; second, that the plaintiff proved 
reasonable and actual damages as a result of the defendant's failure to reconvey; third, that the 
trial court erred in dismissing the matter; fourth, that it would be overly unjust and prejudicial to 
remand the case to the trial court; fifth, that the record is sufficient to independently evaluate the 
matter; and sixth, the Court of Appeals should find for the plaintiff, awarding double damages, 
attorneys fees and costs, both for the trial court action and for the appeal. 
iti 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1995. 
[QMAS L. HOWARD, Esq 
x>rney for Appellants 
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BUY-OUT AGREEMENT 
AGREEMENT made this -1 / day of August, 1991, by and between Jacquelyn 
\. McGrail ("Seller"), and Dennis J. McGrail and Maria M. Spansk-McGrail 
(collectively "Buyer"). 
RECITALS 
WHEREAS, Buyer and Seller own a respective 50% undivided interest, as 
tenants-in-common, in that certain real property ("Property"), located in 
Summit County, State of Utah, as more specifically describpd in Exhibit "A", 
attached hereto. 
WHEREAS, Seller desires to sell to Buyer, and Buyer desires to purchase 
from Seller, Seller's 50% undivided interest in the Property. 
WHEREAS, Buyer desires to apply for and obtain financing with which to 
purchase Seller's interest in the Property and to refinance the parties' 
current mortgage obligation against the Property. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing Recitals, and in 
iurther consideration of the mutual covenants and agreements herein 
contained, the parties hereto agree, as follows: 
1,. Seller hereby sells to Buyer, and Buyer hereby purchases from 
seller, for the purchase price of Fourty-Seven Thousand Two Hundred and 
illeven Dollars ($47,211.00)^Lall of Buyer's right, title and interest in and 
to the Property. Said Purchase Price shall be paid to Buyer, in cash or 
certified funds, following the closing of Buyer's new loan, at which time the 
seller shall convey all of her right, title and interest in the Property to 
tiuyer in the form of a Quit-Claim Deed, a copy of which is attached hereto 
marked as Exhibit "B". 
2. Buyer agrees that upon the closing of this Agreement, Buyer shall 
uecome solely responsible for all obligations and liabilities which pertain 
co the Property, forever releasing and discharging Seller from the same. 
Buyer further agrees to provide all necessary notice, including the execution 
ot all assumption and release documents, if any, that may be deemed necessary 
by Seller, to the creditors having any interest in the Property. 
3. Buyer and Seller agree that this Agreement is expressly contingent 
upon the Buyer's obtaining a new loan with which to refinance the current 
mortgage on the Property and to fund this Buy-Out Agreement. Buyer and 
seller agree that this Buy-Out Agreement shall be performed upon the closing 
of Buyer's referenced new loan. 
4. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that Seller is currently residing on 
the Property and that upon the closing of this Agreement, Seller wishes to 
remain for a period of days, the number of which being contingent upon the 
ilate of Seller's closing of the purchase of another parcel of real property, 
or as is mutually agreed to by the parties$wf^3eller aarees to n^v *-o RHWAV 
of time, the sum of $n per month, to be prorated on a daily basis 
in accordance to the (actual number of days Seller resides on the Property 
following the closing of this Agreement, 
5. This instrument embodies the entire agreement among the parties 
hereto with respect to the transactions contemplated hereunder and there are 
no agreements, representations or warranties between the parties other that 
those set forth or provided for herein. Time is of the essence with respect 
co this Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Agreement on 
the date first above written. 
BUYER SELLER 
ennis J. McCyfail 
aria M. Spansk-McGrail 
juyout.meg 
TRUST DEED NOTE 
DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note, with Trust Deed securing same, must be surrendered 
to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made. 
$ 5 , 2 1 1 . 0 0 Park City. f . Utah 
September, 1
 i a 91 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of 
JACQUELYN A...MCGRAIL 
Ihil uj.b.s.1 V .LU^; .A^ . .XO.^OO Q^, L:^..r.L^&^. 
flVE,TOP.ySAND TWO^  ( j 5 . 2 1 1 . 0 0 ^ 
together with interest from date at the rate of....ZERO. per cent ( . 0 , 0 0 ^ ) per annum on 
the unpaid principal, said principal and interest payable as follow*: 
The sum of $1,000.00 on or before the 1st day of October 1991. and the sum of 
$1,000.00 on or before the 1st day of each and every month thereafter until 
february 1. 1992 when the remaining unpaid principal is due and payable in full. 
Each payment shall be applied first to accrued interest and the balance to the reduction of principal. kiJfl 
If default occurs in" the payment of said installments of principal and interest or any part thereof, or in 
the performance of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note, the holder hereof, at its 
option and without notice or demand, may declare the entire principal balance and accrued interest due and 
payable. 
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or interest, either with 
or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection including 
4 reasonable attorney's fee. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof severally waive presentment for payment, demand 
and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent to any and all extensions of time, renewals, 
waivers or modifications that may be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other pro-
visions of this note, and to the release of any security, or any part thereof, with or without substitution. 
This note is secuied by a Trust Deed oi even date herewith. 
Accepted and Approved /~"~\ l j J 
/3ixc/\uelyn A. McCrail 
Maria Mr'Snans'k^rnr^'Vi 
ci( -r^i^{ 
e* 
• 
• j 
• • 
• 
• 
June 8, 1992 
Founders Title Company 
1890 Bonanza Drive 
P.O. Box 680845 
Park City, Utah 84068-0845 
Phone (801) 649-1945 
From Salt Lake (801) 531-9606 
Jacquelin McGrail 
1611 West Village Round Drive 
Park City, Utah 84060 
RE: Order No. F-S 1914 
Dear Jacqueline, 
In connection with this order, enclosed is a Request for full Reconveyance 
for you to sign for the Trust Deed and Note to be released. Will you please 
sign the Request and send it back to me along with the Original Note and 
Trust Deed. Please mark "Paid In Full" across the face of the Note. 
When we receive these documents we will be able to prepare a release and have 
it recorded. 
We appreciate your help in this matter and if you have any questions, please 
let me know/ 
Sincerely, 
FOUNDERS TITLE COMPANY 
BY: 
Kevin DiStefano 
KD/d3 
Enc. 
Salt Lake City Office 
1100 East 6600 South, Suite 140 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Phone (801) 261-5505 
Davis Office 
1133 North Main 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Phone (801) 546-0606 
Wasatch Office 
30 North Main 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
C - ~ / O A 1 V *» ' 
Order No. F-s-1914 
REQUEST FOR FULL RECONVEYANCE 
To : FOUNDERS TITLE COMPANY, T r u s t e e 
The unders igned Is t h e l e g a l owner and h o l d e r of t h e Note and a l l o t h e r 
I n d e b t e d n e s s , secured by t h e T r u s t Deed dated t h e day of August 
, 19 91 , r e c o r d e d t he 4th day of September
 f \#l f a s En t r y No. 
346262* In Book 622 , a t Page 528 * * * , r e c o r d s of Summit County , U t a h . 
Said No te , t o g e t h e r w i t h a l l o t h e r I ndeb tedness secured by s a i d T r u s t Deed 
has been pa id and s a t i s f i e d , and you are hereby r e q u e s t e d and d i r e c t e d , on 
payment t o you of any sums owing t o you under t h e terms of s a i d T r u s t Deed 
t o cance l s a i d Note above m e n t i o n e d , and a l l o t h e r ev idences of 
Indeb tedness secured by s a i d T r u s t Deed d e l i v e r e d t o you h e r e w i t h , 
t o g e t h e r w i t h tho s a i d T r u s t Deed and t o reconvey w i t h o u t wa r ran t y t o the 
p a r t i e s d e s i g n a t e d by t h e terms of s a i d T r u s t Deed, a l l t h e e s t a t e now 
h e l d by you t h e r e u n d e r In and t o t he p r o p e r t y d e s c r i b e d as f o l l o w s : 
See Attached Legal Description 
ORIGINAL NOTE AND TRUST DEED MUST BE SENT WITH THIS DOCUMENT FOR 
RECONVEYANCE. 
and re-recorded Septebiner 18, 1991 as Entry No. 347198 In Book 628 a t page 662 of 
o f f i c i a l records. 
Witness B£NE?7ciARY 
BENEFICIARY 
F-S-1914 
Lot 381. Highland Estates Plat A. EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 381. HIGHLAND ESTATES'PLAT "A", and running 
thence North 88 degrees 39*22" West 300 feet: thence Southerly along the Westerly lot 
line of said Lot 381, 78.34 feet; thence South along the Westerly lot line 41.99 feet 
a point which is 113 feet North 0*31*32" West from the Southwest corner of said lot: 
thence North 89*56*28" East 300 feet more or less to a point on the Easterly lot line 
said Lot 381 which point is North 0 degrees 03*32" West 113 feet from the Southeast < 
corner of said lot 381; thence North 0 degrees 03*32" West 41.99 feet along said Easte 
line; thence Northerly along a curve to the right and along said Easterly line a distai 
of 71 feet, more or less to the point of beginning. 
Dennis J. McGrail 
Maria M. Spansk-MeCrai1 
6255 N. Snowview Dr. 
Park City, UT 84060 
September 7, 1993 
Jacquelyn A. McGrail 
1611 W. Village Round Dr. 
Park City, UT 84060 
FORMAL NOTICE 
RerTRUST DEED on property at 6255 N. Snowview Dr. of September 1, 1991. 
Dear Jacquelyn, 
In accordance with the Trust Deed Note on 6255 N. Snowview Dr. 
executed September 1, 1991, we, the undersigned, require that you 
surrender the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note to the Trustee, Founders 
Title Company, 1890 Bonanza Dr. Park City,UT, within thirty(30) days 
of receipt of this Notice so that reconveyance can be made. 
Copies of the Trust Deed Note, cancelled checks documenting pay-
ments made in full on the dates specified in the agreement, and bills 
outstanding at the time of the agreement are provided as enclosures. 
Failure to surrender the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note within 
thirty days will force us to seek legal proceedings to enforce the 
agreement, provide for payment of legal costs, and award punitive dam-
ages for clouding Title. 
Sincerely, 
De'nnis J. McGrail 
Maria M. Spansk-McGrai1 
Enclosures 
THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR: 
LINDA CAKO 
CAKO FINANCIAL 
SUITE 200 
3760 SOUTH HIGHLAND DRIVE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84117 
REFERENCE: 
ATTN: LINDA 
MCGRAIL,DENNIS JOHN/MARIA MARGARET SPANSK-
6255 NORTH SNOW VIEW DRIVE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84 060 
ESTIMATED TITLE FEES 
FAM ALTA Policy 
Endorsement 100, 
Endorsement 116, 
$139,000.00 60% 
Restrictions 
Land Location 
Endorsement 8.1 Environmental 
445.00 
20.00 
10.00 
25.00 
* * * * * TOTAL: $500.00 
PLEASE DO NOT PAY FROM THIS ESTIMATE. 
AN INVOICE WILL FOLLOW. 
Please refer to our Order # P18784 
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY 
P.O. BOX 478 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84110-0478 
801-363-0909 
SCHEDULE A 
Commitment No. P18784 
Effective Date: October 27, 1993 „at 8:00 A.M. 
Policy to be issued: 
"ALTA" Loan Policy $139,000.00 
With CLTA 100. & 116. & 8.1 Endorsement 
Proposed Insured: 
CAKO FINANCIAL 
The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this 
Commitment and covered herein is 
Fee Simple 
Title to the estate or interest covered herein is at the effective 
date hereof vested in: 
DENNIS J. MCGRAIL and MARIA M. SPANSK- MCGRAIL, husband and wife, as 
Joint Tenants 
The land referred to in this Commitment is situated in the State of 
Utah, County of Summit and is described as follows: 
LOT 381, HIGHLAND ESTATES, PLAT A, EXCEPTING THEREFROM THE FOLLOWING: 
BEGINNING AT THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF OF LOT 381, HIGHLAND ESTATES 
PLAT "A", AND RUNNING THENCE NORTH 88 DEGREES 39 MINUTES 22 SECONDS 
WEST 3 00 FEET; THENCE SOUTHERLY ALONG THE WESTERLY LOT LINE OF SAID 
LOT 381, 78.34 FEET; THENCE SOUTH ALONG THE WESTERLY LOT LINE 41.99 
FEET TO A POINT WHICH IS 113 FEET NORTH 0 DEGREES 31 MINUTES 32 
SECONDS WEST FROM THE SOUTHWEST CORNER OF SAID LOT; THENCE NORTH 89 
DEGREES 56 MINUTES 28 SECONDS EAST 300 FEET MORE OR LESS TO A POINT ON 
THE EASTERLY LOT LINE OF SAID LOT 381 WHICH POINT IS NORTH 0 DEGREES 
03 MINUTES 32 SECONDS WEST 113 FEET FROM THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF SAID 
LOT 381; THENCE NORTH 0 DEGREES 03 MINUTES 32 SECONDS WEST 41.99 FEET 
ALONG SAID EASTERLY LINE; THENCE NORTHERLY ALONG A CURVE TO THE RIGHT 
AND ALONG SAID EASTERLY LINE A DISTANCE OF 71 FEET, MORE OR LESS TO 
THE POINT OF BEGINNING. 
SCHEDULE A 
Commitment No. P18784 
For Information Only 
Property address: 
6255 NORTH SNOW VIEW DRIVE 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84 060 
SCHEDULE B-l 
(Requirements) Commitment No. P18784 
he following are the requirements to be complied with: 
Payment to, or for the account of, the sellers or mortgagors of the 
full consideration for the estate or interest to be insured. 
Instruments in insurable form which must be executed, delivered and 
duly filed for record. 
Note: The Company hereby reserves the right to add additional special 
exceptions to coverage and/or requirements for the issuance of any 
policy pursuant to this commitment upon its receipt of additional 
information including, but not limited to, any items herein below. 
Quit Claim Deed from DENNIS J. MCGRAIL and MARIA M. SPANSK- MCGRAIL, 
husband and wife, as Joint Tenants, vesting fee simple title to DENNIS 
JOHN MCGRAIL and MARIA MARGARET SPANSK- MCGRAIL. 
Deed of Reconveyance clearing Schedule B-2, Exception No. 13, attached 
hereto. 
Deed of Reconveyance clearing Schedule B-2, Exception No. 14, attached 
hereto. 
Trust Deed or Mortgage from DENNIS JOHN MCGRAIL and MARIA MARGARET 
SPANSK- MCGRAIL, to secure your loan. 
NOTE: The following name(s) have been checked in the records of the 
Summit County Clerk for Judgments, and the Summit County Recorder for 
Federal Tax Liens: 
DENNIS JOHN MCGRAIL 
MARIA MARGARET SPANSK- MCGRAIL 
DENNIS J. MCGRAIL 
MARIA M. SPANSK- MCGRAIL 
SCHEDULE B-l 
(Requirements) Commitment No. P18784 
No unsatisfied Judgment Liens or Federal Tax Liens have been found. 
SCHEDULE B-2 
(Exceptions) Commitment No. P18784 
The policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the 
following unless the same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the 
Company. 
1. Taxes or assessments which are not shown as existing liens by the 
records of any taxing authority that levies taxes or assessments on 
real property or by the public records. 
2. Any facts, rights, interests, or claims which are not shown by the 
public records but which could be ascertained by an inspection of said 
land or by making inquiry of persons in possession thereof. 
3. Easements, claims of easement or encumbrances which are not shown by 
the public records. 
1. Discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, 
encroachments, or any other facts which a correct survey would 
disclose, and which are not shown by the public records. 
5. Unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in 
Acts authorizing the issuance thereof; water rights, claims or title 
to water. 
5. Any lien, or right to a lien, for services, labor or material 
theretofore or hereafter furnished, imposed by law and not shown by 
the public records. 
7. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, 
created, first appearing in the public records or attaching subsequent 
to the effective date hereof but prior to the proposed insured 
acquiring of record for value the estate or interest or mortgage 
thereon covered by this commitment. 
tote: Items 1 through 7 will be eliminated from the Lender's Policy. 
3. Taxes for the year 1993, have been assessed in the amount of 
$1,001.81, and are due and payable on November 1, 1993, and will be 
delinquent on November 30, 1993. Taxes for the year 1992 have been 
paid. (Serial No. HE-A-381-A). 
5. Said property is located within the boundaries of Snyderville Basin 
Sewer District and is subject to charges and assessments levied 
thereunder. 
10. A Resolution dated, October 8, 1986, wherein The Board of 
Commissioners of Summit County, Utah, did adopt a Resolution to create 
Park City Snyderville Recreation Service District. Said Notice 
recorded October 14, 1986, as Entry No. 259244, in Book 402, at Page 
SCHEDULE B-2 
(Exceptions) Commitment No. P18784 
614, Summit County Recorder's Office. 
Resolution No. 93-2 dated February 1, 1993 changing name to "The 
Snyderville Basin Special Recreation District" recorded February 1, 
1993 as Entry No. 373176, in Book 707, at Page 148, in Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
. Notice of Intention to establish Summit County Special Service 
District No. 1, recorded April 28, 1989, as Entry No. 307478, in Book 
519, at Page 725, Summit County Recorder's Office. 
. Said property is located within the boundaries of SUMMIT COUNTY LEVY, 
PARK CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, 
SUMMIT COUNTY SERVICE AREA NO. 6, SERVICE AREA NO. 7 PARK CITY FIRE 
SERVICE DISTRICT, PARK CITY FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT and is subject to 
charges and assessments levied thereunder. 
. A Deed of Trust securing an indebtedness of the amount stated therein 
and any other amounts payable under the terms thereof; 
Dated August 27, 1991 
Trustor DENNIS J. MCGRAIL AND MARIS M. 
SPANSK-MCGRAIL, HUSBAND AND WIFE 
Amount $129,700.00 
Trustee CAPITAL CITY BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION 
Beneficiary CAPITAL CITY BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION 
Recorded September 03, 1991 
Entry No. 346222 
Book 622 
Page 449 
NOTE: The above document was re-recorded on September 18, 1991, as 
Entry No. 347197, in Book 625, at Page 101. 
NOTE: The above document was re-recorded on October 16, 1991, as Entry 
No. 348427, in Book 628, at Page 657. 
Assigned to CHEMICAL BANK C/O CHEMICAL MORTGAGE COMPANY, by 
Assignment of TRUST DEED, dated September 03, 1991, from CAPITAL CITY 
BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION, recorded September 27, 1991, as Entry No. 
347693, in Book 626, at Page 492, Summit County Recorder's Office. 
NOTE: The above document was re-recorded on October 30, 1991 as Entry 
No. 349104, in Book 630, at Page 587. 
4. A Deed of Trust securing an indebtedness of the amount stated therein 
and any other amounts payable under the terms thereof: 
Dated August 27, 1991 
Trustor DENNIS J. MCGRAIL AND MARIA M. 
SPANSK-MCGRAIL 
SCHEDULE B-2 
(Exceptions) Commitment No. P18784 
Amount $5,211.00 
Trustee FOUNDERS TITLE COMPANY 
Beneficiary JACQUELYN A. MCGRAIL 
Recorded September 04, 1991 
Entry No. 346262 
Book 622 
Page 528 
NOTE: The above document was re-recorded on September 18, 1991, as 
Entry No. 347198, in Book 625, at Page 106. 
NOTE: The above document was re-recorded on October 16, 1991, as Entry 
No. 348428, in Book 628, at Page 662. 
15. Water Agreement, dated February 28, 1974, by and between CROSSROADS 
WATER COMPANY, INC. and HIGH VALLEY WATER COMPANY, recorded August 16, 
1974, as Entry No. 124046, in Book 58, at Page 626, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Assigned to HIGH VALLEY WATER COMPANY, by Assignment of WATER 
AGREEMENT, dated March 01, 1982, from CROSSROADS WATER COMPANY, INC., 
recorded June 05, 1982, as Entry No. 192824, in Book 224, at Page 1, 
Summit County Recorder's Office. 
16. A Six (6) foot Public Utility and Bridal Path Easement running along 
Westerly Side of the subject property as shown on the recorded plat of 
said subdivision. 
17. A Thirty-three (33) foot right of way and roadway commonly known as 
Snow View Drive running over and across the Easterly Side side of the 
subject property as shown on the recorded plat of said subdivision. 
18. Restrictive Covenants for HIGHLAND ESTATES, recorded July 06, 1964, as 
Entry No. 99080, in Book 6A, at Page 135, Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
Restrictive Covenants for HIGHLAND ESTATES, recorded July 21, 1965, 
as Entry No. 101379, in Book 2, at Page 26, Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
19. Restrictive Covenants for HIGHLAND ESTATES, recorded March 14, 1972, 
as Entry No. 115452, in Book 37, at Page 195, Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
20. Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded October 13, 
1989 as Entry No. 314291, in Book 538, at Page 630, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
SCHEDULE B-2 
(Exceptions) Commitment No. P18784 
Revised Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded April 
24, 1991, as Entry No. 339832, in Book 605, at Page 350, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Revised Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded April 
29, 1991, as Entry No. 339958, in Book 605, at Page 640, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Commercial Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded June 7, 1990, as 
Entry No. 325165, in Book 566, at Page 504, Summit County Recorder's 
Office. 
Excepting therefrom all minerals and ores situated in, upon, or under 
the above described tract of land, together with all rights in 
connection with or relative to the mining, removal or sale of the same 
(but not including the right to enter upon the surface of the 
premises). 
Your Order has been assignee} to LOIS HALL for a Full Service Escrow. 
For questions concerning your escrow contact LOIS at 649-7694 OR 
532-6428. 
NOTE: ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, (THE "COMPANY") CONCERNING THE POLICY OR POLICIES 
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THIS COMMITMENT MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION, PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR, A COPY OF 
WHICH IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED -
BY ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY. THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A 
JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION. 
SCHEDULE B-2 
(Exceptions) Commitment No. P18784 
22. Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded October 13, 
1989 as Entry No. 314291, in Book 538, at Page 630, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Revised Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded April 
24, 1991, as Entry No. 339832, in Book 605, at Page 350, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
Revised Architectural Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded April 
29, 1991, as Entry No. 339958, in Book 605, at Page 640, Summit County 
Recorder's Office. 
23. Commercial Guidelines for Highland Estates recorded June 7, 1990, as 
Entry No. 325165, in Book 566, at Page 504, Summit County Recorder's • 
Office. 
24. Excepting therefrom all minerals and ores situated in, upon, or under 
the above described tract of land, together with all rights in 
connection with or relative to the mining, removal on sale of the same 
(but not including the right to enter upon the surface of the 
premises). 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Your Order has been assigned to LOIS HALL for a Full Service Escrow. 
For questions concerning your escrow contact LOIS at 649-7694 OR 
532-6428. 
NOTE: ANY MATTER IN DISPUTE BETWEEN YOU AND FIRST AMERICAN TITLE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, (THE "COMPANY") CONCERNING THE POLICY OR POLICIES 
ISSUED PURSUANT TO THIS COMMITMENT MAY BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION AS AN 
ALTERNATIVE TO COURT ACTION, PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF THE AMERICAN 
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION OR OTHER RECOGNIZED ARBITRATOR, A COPY OF 
WHICH IS AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST FROM THE COMPANY. ANY DECISION REACHED 
BY ARBITRATION SHALL BE BINDING UPON BOTH YOU AND THE COMPANY. THE 
ARBITRATION AWARD MAY INCLUDE ATTORNEY'S FEES AND MAY BE ENTERED AS A 
JUDGMENT IN ANY COURT OF PROPER JURISDICTION. 
c. 
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1 HiS PLAT IS MADE SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE 
OF ASSISTING IN LOCATING THE LAND. THE 
COftiPANY ASSUMES NO LIABILITY FOR 
v»^t vriON, IF ANY, WITH AN ACCURATE SURVEY. 
LOAN NUMBER:. 
BRANCH 
NUMBER &\1- _ BRANCH 4*,\t U\^ 
A Q W M K . T . ^ M d r i f l M 4 p ^ ? P f e ^ - ^ ^ l l Branch Telephone:!^/) <Hflh-°^()0-
P-opeay: ft ffi» ISI* tCMMl \I\W X>P- j,0 , ll-f^Ui) l l I 
Branch Contact* T<3Mffft|rO Mortgage Broker (if applicable): &ri fc/9 
Sale Price: $ . 
Appraised Value: $„ 
Acquisition Cost $ _ 
Loan Amount $ . 
. Loan to Value: _ 
. PMI Required? _ 
, PMI Premium $_ 
3ML Combined . Loan to Value: 
. Impounds Required. 
. % Coverage: 
. Renewal % 
Appraiser Number: _ 
Loan Processor Number: 
Correspondent Number: 
Credit Report Agency Number:. 
. Underwriter Number: 
. Loan Closer Number. „ 
. Wholesale Broker Number: 
Purchase 1st 
Purchase 2nd: ^. 
Owner Occ. , £L 
2nd Home 
PURPOSE OF LOAN 
± 
PROPERTY TYPE 
Ref»1 st . 
Equity 2nd. 
NorvOcc. . 
Const to Perm. 
HOUSING EXPENSE 
I07\fy 1 M Lion at 
2nd uen at 
Insurance 
Taxes 
PMI 
HOA 
Other 
TOTAL HOUSING 
EXPENSE 
% $ . 
• .. 
$.. 
$_ 
$ 
$_ 
WFz 
^urtr 
SFR 
PUD 
CONDO 
CONDO TYPE. 
PUD TYPE _ 
A 2 Units 
3 Units 
4 Units 
CLASSIFICATION 
Housing Expense Ratio: 
CLASSIFICATION 
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES 
Housing Expense $_J *"' ' ' / 
Revolving/ / /'n r ft 
Installment Debts $ WO*?. C' I 
Red Estate $ , 
Alimony/ 
Child Supp. $ 
I . 
* 
* 
TOTAL MONTHLY 
EXPENSES \ 
EXACT LOAN TYPE 
Program Category #: 
LoanOescnption: . F ^ M A I K VTfc-
Buy-own Description: ... 
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME 
Mortgagor Earnings $ 
., , $ . 
*. 
Co-Mtgr. Earnings $ . 
]k31 Debt Ratio: 
______< S^SXOM*
 S J l f i i ^ 
«_>___t_*w Residual income 
Cash Available to Close CASH (ASSETS) FOR PURCHASE 
Cash in Banks $ __ 
Stocks or Bonds t 
Trade Equities $ _ .____* -_-___. 
Gift * 
Prior Home Proceeds $ 
TOTAL CASH AVAILABLE 
TO CLOSE 6 
Cash Down Payment 
Cloning Cnt f * 
Prepaid Items 
Cash to Pay Debts 
Less {Credits) 
Less Deposit 
Secondary Financing 
TOTAL CASH REQUIRED 
TO CLOSE + 
CASH RESERVES AFTER CLOSING t __.. 
MONTHS 
P.I T.L 
S 
3 
$ 
S 
* 
$ 
$ 
$ 
CASH <ASSETS| FOR REFINANCE 
Cash in Banks 
Stocks or Bonds 
IRA's/401 K's 
TOTAL CASH ASSETS 
^ T H ? 
%)bl IS 
New Loan Amount 
Closing Costs 
Prepaid Items 
Cash to Pay Liens 
Cash to Pay Debts Other than bens 
NET CASH TO BORROWER 
Of applicable) 
CASH REQUIRED TO CLOSE 
FRr>M 2Cnr%C»*cn HI applicable) 
121 VbO.oO 
\\43,m 
CASH RESERVES AFTFR CLOSING * 
SiANDARD LOAN CLOSING CONDI! ^NS 
(May be signed off by closing department) 
Required Approved 
17^ Q PMI Certificate with 
m • 
H 
% coverage 
Required Approved 
r—i I I 
k'„;,•.•" 
f 
k 
q 
! 
• 
Hazard insurance Policy 
Minimum $ 1#1 7fcQ . dD 
Flood Certification 
Flood Insurance Policy 
Appraiser's 44.2 for: .. 
Sets Additional Photos 
Satisfactory Health Inspection Septic 
Satisfactory Health Inspection Well 
Three Day Rescission 
Clear Termite Report 
Notice of Completion from County 
New Construction 
Survey (if required) 
Investor/Pool Insurer Approval 
Estimated Refi Cost Breakdown 
Signed Good Faith Estimate 
Signed Program Disclosure 
Initial REG 2 
Signed 1003 
Correct 1003 to Underwriters Calculations 
Correct 1008 to Underwriters Calculations 
J Loans to be paid at closing 
Title Search/Commission no Liens or 
Judgments against Borrower, delinquent 
taxes, if the loan request is a Refi, must 
be explained in a satisfactory manner. 
CONTINGENCIES OF LOAN APPROVAL 
(Underwriter must approve prior to closing) 
Required Approved 
- B B 
a 
B 
• 
Acceptable W-2's for Tax Years ( ) for; 
Pay Stub showing year to date income for; 
of $. thru 
Acceptable 1040's for Tax Years { ) for: 
Acceptable Profit and Loss Statement and Balance Sheet for date 
Rental Agreement on property located at __ , __ 
lor no \ess than $ .,_ 
Paid receipts for: „
 t 
. per month. 
• a Acceptable Credit Explanation on: . 
• • Closing Statement on Property located at . 
to net minimum of $ .._ 
Acceptable Condominium/PUD Approval, Worksheet and Warranty 
Acceptable Appraisal/Appraisal Review by AMRES Approved Appraiser 
If interest increases from &~7&& %, file must be re-undcr written 
Proof of Liquidation of Stocks, Bonds, IRA's, etc. for Use in Settlement 
Separate Cover Memo Justifying Ratios that Exceed Guidelines {if allowed) 
Ptt CHM4 a am l i w 1 A -Wnett. 4ttil CA \M)A\*U flrt)>M)? 
• M4L<d-h? Yttmtyii At f,\Mftfy* 
rMAAppr^eY io yvo\!\t\t tovtm pfripfls -fV frfrip* 
• 
• 
• 
a 
• 
\Kb (^ 
ADDRESS; 
Required 
.a 
a 
a 
a 
m 
a 
n 
11 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
Approved 
D _ 
D _ 
a _ 
D _ 
D _. . 
• — 
a _ 
D _ 
• — 
a _ 
• — 
a _._ 
a ._ 
CONTINGENCIES OF LOAN APPROVAL (continued) 
Credit documents begin expirina on 
UNDERWRITING RECOMMENDATIONS 
I/O Loan Approved I I Loan Suspended I J Loan Declined 
Justification for Approval/Suspension/Declination 
UNDERWRITERS RECOMMENDATIONS UNDERWRITERS SIGNATURE 
Date „. Approved Suspended Denied. #__ 
Oate Approved ___^ Suspended Denied , #__ 
Date Approved Suspended Denied. #__ 
Date Approved Suspended Denied # 
Rrtel 
Date . Approved ^ Suspended „ Denied ... 
RWRITER'S HA 
Documentation Type: y 
Full/Alternative Documents 
UNDE N ME AND DATE 
Reduced Documents 
FHLMC EXCLUSIONARY LIST: 
UNDERWRITER'S NAME AND OATE 
DATE OP LIST UNDERWRITERS'S NAME AND DATE 
U2"Broker/Correspondent Q l - oan Originator IJaAppraifter 
Checkmark indicates name does not appear on'list. '
 r ,/i\\ 
itfW 
34KD 
FINANCIAL 
4-19-94 
Re; Dennis J. McGrail 
Maria-M. Spansk-McGrail 
6255 N. Snow View Dr. 
Park City, Utah 84060 
To Whom This May Concern, 
Mr and Mrs McGrail have formal loan approval with Cako Financial since 11-21-93 
We have been prevented to close this loan because there is a second lien that 
is on the title report that must be satisfied in order to fund this loan. 
Cako Financial 
Linda Cako 
i^zf-^ e^Ja 
WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
.DE^IS.J... . .Wffi^Ii _ 
. . § l ? 5 . . ? ^ ^ L ? ^ Q ^ I ^ . M i y ? : . _ 
PARK CITY, UTAH 84060 Space above for Recorder's Uae 
F13 1914 
(Corporate Trustee) 
FOUNDERS TITLE COMPANY 
under a Trust Deed dated August 2 7 , 19 91 
DENNIS J . MDGRAIL AND MARIA M. £PANSK-MOGRAIL 
9 /4 /91 & 
, as Trustee 
, eiecuted by 
, as Trustor, 346262
 6 2 7 
and recorded *LlSPL* - 1 9 • ** E n t r y No. ^ J J J g . in Book g j j 
and r e - r e c o r d . 10 /16 /91 
Page(s) ?jj8 of the records of the County Recorder of SUBMIT County, Utah, 
pursuant to ^ written request of the Beneficiary thereunder, does hereby reconvey, without warranty, 
to the person or persons entitled thereto* the t r u s t property now held by it as Trustee under said 
Trust Deed, which Trust Deed covers r ^ property aituated is i-ilT County, 
Utah, described as follows: 
Lot 381, HIGHLAND ESTATES PLAT A* EXCEPTING THEREFRCM THE FOLLOWING: 
BEGINNING at the Northeast corner of Lot 381, HIGHLAND ESTATES PLAT "A", and 
running thence North 88 degrees 39'22" West 300 feet; thence Southerly along the 
Westerly lot line of said Lot 301 # 78.34 feet; thence South along the Westerly lot 
line k\.*& ieet to a point v*hicY> ^  *^> iee't Y*oiYn <b tegxees "iV "52* ^ est xrem trie 
Southwest comer of said lot; thence North 89 degrees 56' 28" East 300 feet more 
or less to a point of the Easterly Lot line of said Lot 381 which point is North 
0 degrees 03* 32" West 113 feet from the Southeast corner of said Lot 381; thence 
Nprth 0 degrees 03' 32" West 41,99 feet along said Easterly line; thence Northerly 
along a curve to the right and #long said Easterly line a distance of 71 feet, mo** 
or less to the point of beginning* 
Dated this 5th day of A p r i l 
R.BRUCE HANCEY.Vice President 
,19 9 4 . 
...FOUNDS T^TLE 
0 0 4 0 1 9 9 6 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF Sl*MIT 
On the 7*? day of 
R. BRUCE HANCEY 
VICE PRESIDENT 
798 PG004Q$-< 
ALAN SPRIGGSt SUMMIT COUNTY RECOfWj 
1994 APR 08 15858 Prt FEE $10.00 • 
REQUEST: FOUNDERS TITLE CO ± 
A p r i l 
i ; 
, 19 94
 t personally appeared before me 
, who being by me duly sworn, did say that he is the 
of FOUNDERS TITLE CCMPANY , 
a corporation, and that said instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of its 
by-laws (or by a resolution of its board oi directors) and said R. BRUCE HANCEY 
•acknowledgedr^me,that,said'Cdrporation executed the sarne^ 
. / / srifrT...; •""" 
^
y
 ccric:7,r %" 
My CommisflioF'Kxpires: 5 / 2 2 / 9 5 
Residing at: 
Notary Public 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 
F O R M N o . 1 4 3 - C — C O R P O R A T E DEED O F R E C O H V C Y A N C K — O Q«M rTo. co. - san »o a.oo I A . T — %AUI CA«* CITY 
No 
RUTH WAGNER (5031) 
1492 WEST MEADOWLOOP RD. 
PARK CITY, UT 84060 
(801) 649-1492 
(801) 649-2983 FAX 
/p: 
^ > 
ij 
F I L E D 
OCT 2 5 1994 lS'.30 
Clerk of Summit County 
By. 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SUMMIT 
MC GRAIL, DENNIS J. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MC GRAIL, JACQUELYN 
Defendant. 
A., | 
> FINDINGS OF FACT 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1 JUDGMENT 
CASE NO. 930390024 QT 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Trial was held in Third District Court, Coalville, on 
May 25, 1994, The Honorable Judge Young presiding. Plaintiff 
appeared with council, Ruth Wagner; Defendant appeared with 
council, Michael Lee. 
2. The merits of the case were heard by the court and 
parties testified and were cross examined by opposing parties as 
well as the court. 
3. Plaintiff testified as to pecuniary damages suffered. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
4. Court stated damages only speculative; 
5. Court stated case was petty; 
V V, 'V t .<. — 0 I* Q • ~ - 0 4 0 i nv*L
JUDGMENT 
6. Court dismissed case with prejudice; 
7. Court adjudged each party to pay own attorney fees and 
costs. 
Dated this 
SUMMIT 
day of 
ffa < JUDGE DAVID YOUNG \ 
**EW* 
BOOIUUPASE 8 4 9 
